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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
A core  element  of  economic  theory  is  the assumption  of stable  preferences.  We  test this
assumption  in  public  goods  games  by  repeatedly  eliciting  cooperation  preferences  in  a  ﬁxed
subject  pool  over  a period  of  ﬁve  months.  We  ﬁnd  that  cooperation  preferences  are  very
stable at  the  aggregate  level,  and,  to a  smaller  degree,  at the  individual  level,  allowing  us to
predict  future  behavior  fairly  accurately.  Furthermore,  our  results  provide  evidence  on  the
psychological  foundations  of  cooperation  preferences.  The  personality  dimension  ‘Agree-
ableness’ is  closely  related  to both  the  type  and  the  stability  of  cooperation  preferences.
© 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
. Introduction
In his inﬂuential essay on “The Methodology of Positive Economics” (1953, p. 4),  Friedman explains that the task of eco-
omic theory “is to provide a system of generalizations that can be used to make correct predictions about the consequences
f any change in circumstances”.
In brief, an important aspect of economic theory is to make predictions, which are enormously facilitated if peoples’ tastes
re stable across time and circumstances. The assumption of stable preferences belongs accordingly to the core elements of
conomic theory, or, as Becker (1976, p. 5) puts it: “The combined assumptions of maximizing behavior, market equilibrium,
nd stable preferences, used relentlessly and unﬂinchingly, form the heart of the economic approach as I see it”.
On the same page Becker also argues that “preferences are assumed not to change substantially over time”. He explains
hat the assumption of preference stability both across different circumstances and over time “provides a stable foundation
or generating predictions about responses to various changes, and prevents the analyst from succumbing to the temptation
f simply postulating the required shift in preferences to “explain” all apparent contradictions to his predictions”. Whether
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the assumption of preference stability is reasonable for real world preferences is ultimately an empirical question. However,
empirical evidence on preference stability is surprisingly scarce.
In this paper we present experimental evidence on the stability of social preferences, more precisely on the stability
of preferences for cooperation in a social dilemma. We  measure cooperation preferences by Fischbacher et al.’s (2001,
henceforth FGF) variant of the four player one-shot public goods game and repeat the measurement with the identical
subject pool after two and a half and ﬁve months. The FGF method has the advantage of measuring cooperativeness to a
large degree independent of subjects’ beliefs, which are presumably more volatile than preferences.1 Furthermore, we also
present evidence on the psychological foundations of cooperation preferences, more speciﬁcally on the effects of individual
differences in personality on these preferences. Our experimental setup enables us to investigate (i) aggregate-level and
individual-level stability of cooperation preferences over time and (ii) the relationship between stable personality traits and
cooperation preferences.
Our paper contributes to a nascent body of literature on the stability of social preferences. However, the existing literature
has largely focused on the distribution of heterogeneous preference types across different experiments at the aggregate
level.2 The few studies that have examined individual-level stability can be divided into two  categories.
The ﬁrst category includes studies investigating the consistency and stability of social preferences across different games
or variants of the same game in a given experimental session. Andreoni and Miller (2002) and Fisman et al. (2007) apply
the axioms of revealed preferences to decisions observed in modiﬁed dictator games. They ﬁnd that subjects’ choices can be
rationalized by a well-behaved utility function. Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) elicit individual cooperation preferences in
a strategy method experiment and observe contributions in ten consecutive one-shot games in the direct response mode.
They ﬁnd that data on individual cooperation preferences allow to predict the development of contributions over time very
accurately.3 Blanco et al. (2011) investigate the stability of preferences across different games by observing the same sample
of subjects in a number of different one-shot games. They ﬁnd that about one third of their subjects exhibit stable preferences
in the sense that they consistently follow a plausible behavioral norm.4
The second category of research includes a very small number of studies examining longitudinal stability of social pref-
erences over time. Muller et al. (2008) elicit subjects’ cooperation preferences repeatedly in a series of ﬁve consecutively
played two-stage public goods experiments within one session. They ﬁnd that 37 percent of their 60 subjects remain in
the same preference category for all ﬁve measurements. Studies allowing for more time between the measurements are
particularly scarce.5 Brosig et al. (2007) implement sequential prisoner’s dilemma games and repeat the initial experiment
with the same subject pool two times with one month in between each repetition. They ﬁnd that 43 percent of the subjects
choose the same response in all three waves, and all of these subjects act consistently selﬁsh. On average they observe a
decay of cooperative behavior over time.
In contrast to Brosig et al. (2007),  we observe highly stable aggregate results. The distribution of cooperation preferences
is basically unchanged across time. At the individual level we  observe a more diverse picture. If we classify our subjects
into three categories (Conditional Cooperators, Free Riders and Others) we  ﬁnd that about two  thirds of the subjects remain
in the same category for two consecutive measurements. Half of the subjects remain in the same category for all three
measurements.
While the temporal stability of cooperation preferences is the main focus of the present paper, we are also exploring
the psychological foundations of preference heterogeneity and stability. The idea to include psychological variables into
the analysis of cooperation preference stability came from a related paper (Volk et al., 2011), which is based on the same
data as this paper, and which served to some extent as a preparatory analysis for the present paper. In Volk et al. (2011)
the main focus is on how personal values and personality traits are related to one another and how they jointly impact
cooperation preferences. This analysis is important because one of the problems inherent in the study of psychological
correlates of economic behavior is the large number of conceivably important psychological constructs to pick from. Two
particularly interesting constructs are personality traits and personal values as they represent the difference between innate
characteristics representing the nature of an individual (i.e., personality traits) and socially learned characteristics resulting
from the interaction of nature and nurture (i.e., personal values) (see for example Olver and Mooradian, 2003; Parks and
1 There is of course no way  to measure preferences directly. In a strict sense it is thus impossible to test preference stability. We  also cannot identify the
proximate mechanism which causes subjects to contribute, be it interdependent preferences or reciprocity (see Cox, 2004; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger,
2004;  Falk and Fischbacher, 2006; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). The FGF design offers a way  to measure contribution strategies in public goods games. A large
variety of social preferences give rise to identical contribution strategies. Thus, in a strict sense, all we can show is the stability of contribution strategies
over  time. For many applications (e.g. predicting future behavior in similar situations) it is sufﬁcient to know that contribution strategies are stable.
2 For experiments using the FGF design see Kocher et al. (2008), Herrmann and Thöni (2009), and Thöni et al. (2009). Homo/heterogeneity between
subject  pools in repeated public goods games are studied in Gächter et al. (2010).
3 Burlando and Guala (2005) and Gächter and Thöni (2005) investigate preference stability in a setting where they regroup subjects according to their
cooperation preferences. They use initial public goods games to identify different types and form groups of alike subjects and observe contributions in
repeated public goods games.
4 See also De Oliveira et al. (2009). A related strand of literature investigates whether different elicitation methods (strategy method vs. direct response
method) lead to identical inference about subjects’ preferences, see Brandts and Charness (2011) for an overview or Fischbacher and Gächter (2009) for
the  FGF design.
5 Horowitz (1992), Andersen et al. (2008) and Zeisberger et al. (in press) investigate the stability of risk preferences over time. Meier and Sprenger (2010)
present data on the stability of time preferences.
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uay, 2009). The results of Volk et al. (2011) suggest that while personality traits and personal values are both indicative of
ndividual preferences for cooperation, personality traits are the stronger predictor. In the present paper we therefore focus
n personality traits. Our results indicate that the personality dimension Agreeableness, which is related to one’s tendency
o be cooperative rather than competitive (Costa and McCrae, 1992), appears to be part of the psychological foundations of
ooperation preference heterogeneity and stability. We  ﬁnd that Free Riders and Conditional Cooperators are characterized
y different levels of Agreeableness and that higher levels of Agreeableness are associated with more stable preferences for
onditional cooperation, while lower levels are associated with more stable preferences for free riding.
The latter ﬁndings contribute to an emerging research stream that seeks to identify “personality and attitude variables
hat allow the classiﬁcation of subjects into different “types” whose decision behavior in social dilemmas may  be described
y alternative models” (Rapoport and Suleiman, 1993, p. 193).6 Indeed, economists and psychologists are increasingly rec-
gnizing the potential of incorporating insights from personality psychology into economic models of preference formation
nd stability. Ferguson et al. (2011) argue that the overlap between personality traits and preferences is a key research issue
n both economics and psychology. They also point out that “[e]conomic models of preferences will beneﬁt from studies
n cross-situational consistency and temporal stability” (p. 202). In a comprehensive review of the relationship between
ersonality traits and economic preferences, Almlund et al. (forthcoming, p. 157) conclude that personality psychology
promises to provide a deeper understanding of conventional economic preference parameters and how they arise. Unfor-
unately, at the time of this writing, this promise remains unfulﬁlled”. In this paper we attempt to contribute to this line of
esearch.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we  describe our experimental design and our question-
aire, in Section 3 we present the results and Section 4 concludes.
. Methods
.1. Experimental design and procedures
The data reported in this paper come from an experimental part and a questionnaire part. In the experimental part we
sed the design introduced by FGF to measure cooperation preferences in public goods games. In order to analyze whether
ooperation preferences are stable over time, we  replicated the protocol used by FGF and repeated our initial study (Wave
) in a random matching mode two and a half (Wave 2) and ﬁve months (Wave 3) after the ﬁrst study by inviting the same
articipants back to the laboratory. All sessions used an identical protocol in which subjects were randomly assigned to
roups of four members. Group compositions were unknown to the subjects and not revealed after the experiments. The
asic decision situation was a standard linear public goods game. Each subject received an endowment of 20 tokens and
hose a contribution ci ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 20} to a linear public good with a marginal per capita return of 0.4. The payoff function
as given by
i = 20 − ci + 0.4
4∑
j=1
cj,
here the public good is equal to the sum of the contributions of all four group members.
In the experiment subjects had to make two types of contribution decisions, an ‘unconditional’ and a ‘conditional’ con-
ribution to the public good. The unconditional contribution was a single decision about how many of the 20 tokens to
nvest into the public good. For the conditional contribution, subjects had to ﬁll in a table showing the 21 possible average
ontribution levels of the other three group members (rounded to integers). They were asked to state for each of the 21
ossibilities their corresponding contribution. After all subjects had made both types of decisions, a random mechanism
etermined which of the two decisions became outcome relevant. The random mechanism (throw of a die) selected in
ach group one subject that contributed according to his or her ‘contribution table’, while the other three group members
ontributed according to their unconditional contribution.
We  conducted our experiments in the computer lab of a European university, using the software z-Tree (Fischbacher,
007). We  observed the decisions of 72 subjects at times 1 and 2. Four of these did not return for the third study leaving us
ith 68 subjects with complete information at all three points in time. Subjects were informed in Wave 1 that they would
articipate in three identical experiments over the course of ﬁve months. They were also informed that group composi-
ions would change randomly in each wave. In the experiments participants were randomly seated at separated computer
6 The relation between personality measures and other-regarding, prosocial behavior has been studied in public goods games (Fleming and Zizzo, 2011;
urzban and Houser, 2001; Perugini et al., 2010; Skatova and Ferguson, 2011; Volk et al., 2011), dictator games (Ben-Ner et al., 2004a,b; Ben-Ner and Kramer,
011),  ultimatum games (Brandstätter and Königstein, 2001) and a series of distribution games (Bartling et al., 2009). Ashton et al. (1998) and Hirsh and
eterson (2009) study the correlation between personality measures and nonincentiviced measures for cooperation. Boone et al. (1999, 2002) correlate
ersonality measures like ‘Locus of control’ with cooperation in prisoners’ dilemma games. Gunnthorsdottir et al. (2002) and Meyer (1992) investigate the
elationship between Machiavellianism and behavior in the trust game and the ultimatum game, respectively. For the relation between survey measured
rust  and experimentally measured cooperative behavior see also Gächter et al. (2004).
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terminals, received written instructions and had to answer a number of control questions. At the end of the experiments the
participants were informed about their ﬁnal payoff and paid privately. On average, subjects earned about US$ 13 in each of
the three experiments.7
2.2. Questionnaire
We  assessed individual differences in personality traits by a measure of the Big-Five model of personality which was
administered after the experiment of Wave 1. Personality traits have an estimated annual stability coefﬁcient of 0.98, indi-
cating high stability over lifetime (Conley, 1985).8 Research has accordingly shown that subjects completing a personality
questionnaire more than once will tend to obtain highly similar scores (e.g., McCrae and Costa, 1990). In order to reduce
the potential for transient measurement error (e.g., Chmielewski and Watson, 2009) resulting from participant frustra-
tion and carelessness associated with completing the same personality questionnaire repeatedly, we  measured personality
characteristics in Wave 1 and did not repeat the measurement in the subsequent waves.
The Big-Five model is the standard trait framework for research in personality (Goldberg, 1993; John and Srivastava,
1999) and has enjoyed increasing popularity across a wide variety of disciplines including economics.9 The model speci-
ﬁes that ﬁve overarching dimensions account for the biggest part of between-subject variation in stable personality traits.
These dimensions are Extraversion (sociable, active, and energetic), Agreeableness (cooperative, considerate, and trust-
ing), Conscientiousness (dependable, organized, and persistent), Emotional Stability (calm, secure, and unemotional) and
Openness to Experience (imaginative, intellectual, and artistically sensitive). While we measured all ﬁve dimensions, one
of them, Agreeableness, is particularly relevant for our study of cooperation preferences. Agreeableness is centrally related
to one’s tendencies to strive for cooperation rather than competition (Costa and McCrae, 1992). Moreover, individuals high
on Agreeableness are generally more inclined to forgo self-interests in favor of collective interests than individuals low on
Agreeableness (e.g., Buss, 1991; Koole et al., 2001). Graziano and Eisenberg (1997) therefore conclude that Agreeableness is
the personality dimension most closely related to prosocial behavior. We  therefore expected Agreeableness to be positively
correlated with subjects’ cooperativeness in our experiments.
We elicited personality traits by a Ten-Item Personality Inventory (TIPI), which includes a subscale for each of the ﬁve
personality dimensions (Gosling et al., 2003). Each subscale is composed of two  items and each item contains a pair of two
trait descriptors. For example, the ﬁrst item is: “I see myself as extraverted, enthusiastic”. Subjects have to rate on a 7-point
scale ranging from 1: ‘disagree strongly’ up to 7: ‘agree strongly’ the extent to which the pair of traits applies to them. The ten
items are ‘extraverted, enthusiastic’ and ‘reserved, quiet’ (reverse-scored) for the Extraversion subscale; ‘sympathetic, warm’
and ‘critical, quarrelsome’ (reverse-scored) for the Agreeableness subscale; ‘dependable, self-disciplined’ and ‘disorganized,
careless’ (reverse-scored) for the Conscientiousness subscale; ‘calm, emotionally stable’ and ‘anxious, easily upset’ (reverse-
scored) for the Emotional Stability subscale; and ‘open to new experiences, complex’ and ‘conventional, uncreative’ (reverse-
scored) for the Openness to Experience subscale.10
Gosling et al. (2003) reported acceptable psychometric properties for the TIPI with test-retest reliabilities over a period of
six weeks of 0.77 for Extraversion, 0.71 for Agreeableness, 0.76 for Conscientiousness, 0.70 for Emotional Stability and 0.62
for Openness with a mean of 0.72 over all ﬁve subscales, indicating that the scale provides a stable measure of personality
over time.
3. Results
We organize our results as follows: We  start by conducting an instrument check of our experiment and look at aggregate
stability and individual stability. We  then conduct an instrument check of our personality measure before we explore the
impact of the Big-Five personality dimensions on preference heterogeneity and preference stability. Finally, we investigate
the predictive power of preference stability. Speciﬁcally, we  use the data from the ﬁrst and second wave to predict individual
behavior in the third wave and evaluate the prediction with the true data.
3.1. Instrument check public goods gameSince we use the FGF design, we start by checking whether we replicate previous ﬁndings from the literature in our Wave
1 experiment. Following the classiﬁcation of preference types proposed by FGF, we divide our subjects into four categories.
7 In all three waves subjects played a one-shot public goods game and a one-shot public goods game with punishment prior to the experiment reported
here.  Subjects did not, however, receive any information about other subjects’ decisions nor about their payoff. At the end of the experiments they were
informed only of their aggregate payoff.
8 This annual stability coefﬁcient is a corrected estimate based on a wide array of inventory and rating studies.
9 See, e.g., Ameriks et al. (2007),  Bartling et al. (2009),  and Lo et al. (2005).
10 We  administered the original well-validated English version of the TIPI (Gosling et al., 2003, p. 525). While our participants were non-native English
speakers, their English skills were sufﬁcient to properly respond to the English TIPI. The mean scores, standard deviations, inter-item correlations and
Cronbach’s alphas for the ﬁve TIPI subscales obtained in the present study are very similar to those reported in three previous studies using the TIPI with
native  English speakers (Donnellan et al., 2006; Ehrhart et al., 2009; Gosling et al., 2003), indicating that the English TIPI items performed well in our setting.
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Fig. 1. Average conditional cooperation for the three waves.
ll subjects with a contribution schedule that has a signiﬁcant positive slope (p < 0.01, Spearman rank correlation) or shows
 monotonically increasing pattern are classiﬁed as ‘Conditional Cooperators’. ‘Free Riders’ contribute nothing in any case.
ubjects who increase their contribution in the contribution schedule up to some maximum and decrease it thereafter are
alled ‘Hump-shaped’. The remaining subjects fall into the category ‘Others’. We  (FGF) observe 58.3 (50) percent Conditional
ooperators, 25.0 (29.5) percent Free Riders, 2.8 (13.6) percent Hump-shaped and 13.9 (6.8) percent Others.11 We  run a 2
est on the joined data to check whether our distribution of types systematically differs from the one observed by FGF, and
ndeed the differences are borderline signiﬁcant with 2(3) = 6.44; p = 0.092. A closer look at the percentage numbers reveals
hat the greatest difference between our data and the FGF data is the smaller number of Hump-shaped patterns we  observe.
his is not completely unexpected, as other replication studies of the FGF design (e.g., Herrmann and Thöni, 2009; Kocher
t al., 2008; Thöni et al., 2009) also ﬁnd a lower percentage of Hump-shaped patterns. Due to the infrequent occurrence in
ur data we include the Hump-shaped patterns into the category Others. If we compare our data to FGF using this reduced
lassiﬁcation we observe no signiﬁcant differences (2(3) = 0.771; p = 0.680). We conclude that, with regard to the most
nteresting categories, our Wave 1 experiment produced very similar results in comparison to the previous literature.
Remember that our subjects also made unconditional contribution decisions. Our subjects made average unconditional
ontributions of 9.1 tokens (45.7 percent, N = 72) in Wave 1, 10.1 tokens (50.6 percent, N = 72) in Wave 2 and 10.3 tokens
51.3 percent, N = 68) in Wave 3. The differences between the three waves are insigniﬁcant according to Wilcoxon signed
ank tests. The corresponding p-values are p = 0.494 (p = 0.575, p = 0.987) for the comparison between Wave 1 and Wave 2
Wave 1 and Wave 3, Wave 2 and Wave 3). In the FGF experiment subjects made a slightly lower average unconditional
ontribution of 6.7 tokens (33.5 percent of the endowment, N = 44).12
.2. Aggregate stability
Before we  classify our data from the three waves into categories we look at the overall conditional cooperation scheme.
ig. 1 shows the average conditional cooperation schemes for the three waves. The horizontal axis depicts the average
ontribution of the other three subjects, on which a subject can condition the own contribution. The vertical axis shows the
verage of all conditional contribution decisions in a wave.
The curves for the three waves have a similar positive slope, indicating that on average subjects are Conditional Coop-
rators. There seems to be a slight positive trend, i.e., the level of the average conditional contribution is higher in later
aves. We  therefore test for systematic differences between the three times of measurement using the average conditional
ooperation of a subject in a wave as the test variable. Our results show no signiﬁcant differences between the three waves.13
11 N = 72 for our Wave 1 experiment and 44 for the FGF study. The corresponding frequencies for our study (FGF) are: 42 (22) Conditional Cooperators, 18
13)  Free Riders, 2 (6) Hump-shaped and 10 (3) Others.
12 The means of the unconditional contributions of the different types of subjects in Wave 1 (Wave 2; Wave 3) are as follows: Conditional Cooperators:
0.62 (11.98; 11.18), Free Riders: 3.72 (1.57; 0) and Others: 12.08 (12.73; 16).
13 We  use Wilcoxon signed rank tests to test for differences in the average conditional cooperation across waves. The corresponding p-values are p = 0.182
p  = 0.113; p = 0.767) for the comparison between Wave 1 and Wave 2 (Wave 1 and Wave 3; Wave 2 and Wave 3).
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in  a given wave.
Overall, conditional contributions are thus relatively similar over the course of ﬁve months in the same sample of subjects.
Let us now check whether the same holds true for the distribution of types in the population.14 The three bars in Fig. 2
show the frequency of Conditional Cooperators, Free Riders and Others in the three waves of our experiment (ignore for
the moment the dizzying lines between the bars). The distribution of types is apparently very similar across the three
times of measurement. Free Riders account for between 19 percent (Wave 3) and 25 percent (Wave 1) of the population,
while Conditional Cooperators account for between 56 percent (Wave 3) and 60 percent (Wave 2). The distribution of
preference types is not signiﬁcantly different across the three times of measurement (2(4) = 1.994; p = 0.737). This ﬁnding
in combination with the observation that the average conditional cooperation schemes are not signiﬁcantly different across
the three waves (Fig. 1) is in contrast to the results of Brosig et al. (2007) who  report a decay of cooperation in the later
measurements and speculate that their subjects learned the Free Rider strategy over time. While the learning hypothesis
can neither explain our observations nor the observations of Muller et al. (2008),  our data point to a different explanation for
preference stability/instability at the individual level. As we will report in the next sections, our ﬁndings suggest that there is
heterogeneity of individual behavior in terms of both preference types and preference stability (i.e., some individuals seem
to have stable preferences, while others do not), which can be linked to individual differences in dispositional personality
traits.
To conclude, our observations show high aggregate stability over time. Observed changes in the distribution of types as
well as in average conditional contribution schemes are both small and insigniﬁcant. In all three waves we  observe shares
of Conditional Cooperators (56–60 percent) and Free Riders (19–25 percent), which are comparable to the shares reported
in a number of previous studies. These studies have found that between 50 and 60 percent of people can be classiﬁed as
cooperators, while between 20 and 30 percent are Free Riders (e.g., Fischbacher and Gächter, 2010; Kurzban and Houser,
2005). In a next step, we investigate whether this aggregate stability is caused by stability of the contribution patterns at
the individual level.
3.3. Individual stabilityIn order to test for individual stability, we ﬁrst check whether subjects classiﬁed into one of the three classes in the ﬁrst
(second) wave remain in that class in the second (third) wave. With 72 subjects in Waves 1 and 2 and 68 subjects in Wave 3,
there are 140 opportunities for individual preferences to change type between two  times of measurement. In 93 cases (66.4
14 Note that the classiﬁcation into types is only partially sensitive to changes in preferences, because the class Conditional Cooperators allows for many
different degrees of cooperativeness. However, we think that for most applications (like e.g. calibrating theories of social preferences) it is sufﬁcient to
separate distinct classes of behavioral patterns and abstract from the heterogeneity within class.
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Table 1
Relative frequencies of all 27 possible combinations of types in the three waves. Bold numbers show observations on the main diagonal, i.e., the percentage
of  observations that are of the same type in all three waves. Numbers in parentheses denote expected frequencies of combinations of types in all three
waves  if transitions are purely random; all numbers show percentages of the total of 68 observations.
Wave 3 Conditional Cooperator (CC) Free Rider (FR) Other (OT)
Wave 2 CC FR OT CC FR OT CC FR OT
CC
35.3 1.5 2.9 0.0 1.5 1.5 8.8 2.9 5.9
(20.3) (6.4) (6.9) (6.9) (2.2) (2.4) (9.1) (2.9) (3.1)
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aWave 1 FR (8.4) (2.7) (2.9) (2.9) (0.9) (1) (3.8) (1.2) (1.3)
OT
2.9  0.0 2.9 0.0 1.5 1.5 1.5 0.0 4.4
(5) (1.6) (1.7) (1.7) (0.5) (0.6) (2.2) (0.7) (0.8)
ercent) subjects do not change their type between two points in time. Preference stability is somewhat stronger between
ave 2 and Wave 3 (69.1 percent vs. 63.9 percent between Waves 1 and 2).15 Given that we have three measures for each
ubject we can also check whether a subject belongs to the same type in all three waves. Table 1 shows the frequency of all
7 combinations of types in the three waves. Bold numbers indicate the percentage of observations on the main diagonal
hich correspond to stable types in all three waves. Numbers in parentheses indicate the expected frequency which would
esult if types were drawn randomly in each wave from a distribution of types as observed in the respective wave.
Exactly half of the 68 subjects we observe three times are classiﬁed as the same type in all three waves, 35.3 percent display
table Conditional Cooperation preferences, 10.3 percent stable Free Rider preferences, and 4.4 percent are consistently
lassiﬁed as Others. Table 1 shows that for each type observed in Wave 1 it is clearly more frequent that the subject remains of
he same type in later waves than any other combination of types. Comparing the actual frequencies to expected frequencies
hows that stable types are much more likely than expected whereas most other combinations occur less frequent in the
ata than expected under the assumption of random types.
This indicates that we can clearly refute the hypothesis that types are random. To provide a test for this we simulate the
tability of types under the assumption that each player randomly picks a type in Wave 2 and Wave 3 with a probability that
quals the observed relative frequency of the three types in our data. In the simulation we observe that in 21.3 percent of the
ases subjects are of the same type in two adjacent waves (100 runs, standard deviation 3.5 percent points). The hypothesis
f random types can be rejected at any reasonable level of signiﬁcance.16
What are the patterns of the type changes? The three bars in Fig. 2 show the fractions of Conditional Cooperators, Free
iders and Others at the three points in time. The numbers between the bars show the fraction of subjects that remains in
 class or changes to another class in the subsequent wave. All numbers indicate the percentage of subjects relative to the
hole population. For example, 58.3 percent of the subjects are classiﬁed as conditionally cooperative in Wave 1. About
hree fourths of these (and 43.1 percent of all subjects) remain Conditional Cooperators in Wave 2, while 5.6 percent of all
ubjects change from Conditional Cooperator to Free Rider from Wave 1 to Wave 2 and 9.7 percent of all subjects move from
onditional Cooperator to the category Others. Bold lines correspond to observations that remain in a category.
Overall, Fig. 2 shows that the type of the Conditional Cooperator is clearly the most stable category, with three fourth
f the subjects remaining in that class between two waves. Surprisingly, the category of Free Riders seems to be rather
nstable, especially between Wave 1 and Wave 2. Among the 25 percent Free Riders in Wave 1, more than half change their
ype in Wave 2, most of those who change join the conditionally cooperative group. The fraction of Free Riders which stay
n that category increases to almost 70 percent when we compare Wave 2 and Wave 3. However, the group of conditionally
ooperative subjects is still more stable with about 77 percent of the subjects remaining in the same class between Wave 2
nd Wave 3.
In conclusion, our results indicate that, over the course of ﬁve months, there is considerable stability of the distribution
f types both at the individual and at the aggregate level. In a next step, we will use our questionnaire data to explore the
mpact of the Big-Five personality dimensions on preference heterogeneity and preference stability.
.4. Personality and cooperation preferencesWe ﬁrst conduct an instrument check of our personality measure by running a principal components analysis with
arimax rotation on the 10 items of the TIPI scale.17 The analysis suggests a ﬁve factor solution which explains 74 percent
f the variance. Factor loadings are all above 0.60 and all items load on their hypothesized factors.
15 This result is remarkably similar to the ﬁndings of Muller et al. (2008), who examine 60 subjects playing a comparable game in 5 repetitions within the
ame  experimental session. In their design there are 240 opportunities for individual preferences to change and in 66.7 percent of cases subjects remain
n  the same category in the next game.
16 Another measure of the stability of types between waves is Cohen’s  (or Fleiss’s  for all three waves): In our data we  ﬁnd 12 = 0.365, 13 = 0.288,
23 = 0.463, 123 = 0.371 (subscripts denote waves).
17 Principal components analysis is a factor analysis technique that is commonly used as an instrument check in psychometric research to verify the factor
tructure (in case of the TIPI the hypothesized ﬁve factor structure) of psychological measures. Varimax rotation is part of the factor analysis procedure
nd  is done to make the factor solution more interpretable. For more details see e.g. Nunnally and Bernstein (1994).
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Table  2
Multinomial logit estimate for type of conditional cooperation scheme in Wave 1. Omitted case is Conditional Cooperator. Independent variables are the
ﬁve  personality dimensions, demeaned and standardized. Standard errors in parentheses.
Multinomial Logit
Free Rider Other
Extraversion −0.363 0.569
(0.363) (0.429)
Agreeableness −0.898** −0.924**
(0.390) (0.420)
Conscientiousness −0.020 0.384
(0.329) (0.415)
Emotional Stability 0.076 −0.241
(0.342) (0.405)
Openness to Experience 0.782** −0.235
(0.395) (0.360)
Constant −1.060*** −1.468***
(0.340) (0.402)
Model 2 20.1
Prob > 2 0.028
Pseudo R-squared 0.146
N  72
** Signiﬁcance at 5 percent.
*** Signiﬁcance at 1 percent.
In this section, we investigate whether the Big-Five personality dimensions are related to cooperation preferences. The
analysis reported here complements a related analysis in Volk et al. (2011).  We use a multinomial logit model with the
Big-Five personality dimensions as explanatory variables to explain the observed cooperation preference type in Wave 1.
Table 2 shows the results of these estimates. The omitted case is the Conditional Cooperator type. Table 2 shows that two
Big-Five dimensions are signiﬁcantly related to the observed type in Wave 1, Agreeableness and Openness to Experience.
Subjects scoring high on Agreeableness are signiﬁcantly less likely to be classiﬁed as Free Riders compared to Conditional
Cooperators. The same is true for the category Others. Furthermore, scoring high on Openness to Experience is associated
with a higher probability of being classiﬁed as a Free Rider compared to being classiﬁed as a Conditional Cooperator.
What is the size of the personality effect? We  use multinomial logit models to predict probabilities of the three types
dependent on the Agreeableness score in all three waves. Panels A to C in Fig. 3 present the results. The horizontal
axis shows the range of Agreeableness scores we observe in our experimental data (for the distribution of scores see
Fig. A2 in Appendix A). To facilitate the interpretation we de-mean and standardize the values of Agreeableness. The size
of the estimated effect is quite remarkable. In Wave 1, a subject scoring 2.7 standard deviations lower than the average on
Agreeableness has an estimated probability of about 13 percent to be classiﬁed as Conditional Cooperator. For the average
subject the probability is about 63 percent and increases up to 86 percent for a subject scoring 1.4 standard deviations higher
than the average on Agreeableness. Conversely, the estimated probability of being classiﬁed as Free Rider drops from 51
percent to a mere 8 percent if we compare the least to the most agreeable subject in our sample.
What about time effects? We  can use our personality measures elicited in the experiment of Wave 1 to predict the type
in Wave 2, or Wave 3. Panels B and C in Fig. 3 show the results. It turns out that the inﬂuence of Agreeableness on the
types Free Rider and Conditional Cooperator is strong and signiﬁcant in all three waves. The negative connection between
Agreeableness and the type Other observed in Table 2 seems to be reversed in the subsequent waves. However, the effect is
not signiﬁcant. The positive inﬂuence of Openness to Experience on the category Free Rider is insigniﬁcant in Wave 2 and
only marginally signiﬁcant in Wave 3.
How are personality measures associated with preference stability over time? Given that we  have three types of cooper-
ation preferences and three times of measurement, there are ten possible combinations of types. A subject who is classiﬁed
as Conditional Cooperator in all three waves is categorized as ConsistentCC. Likewise, we  observe three times Free Riders
(ConsistentFR). Subjects who are classiﬁed as either Conditional Cooperator or Free Rider in two  out of the three waves are
categorized as 2timesCC and 2timesFR, respectively. All remaining combinations are in the same group (All other).18 We run
a multinomial logit model for these ﬁve categories. Like before, only the personality dimension Agreeableness shows sig-
niﬁcant results. Panel D of Fig. 3 shows the predicted probabilities dependent on Agreeableness. Clearly, the probability of
ConsistentFR is now very strongly connected to the Agreeableness measure. It ranges from 87 percent for the lowest observed
Agreeableness to virtually zero for an Agreeableness score that is a standard deviation above the mean. The category 2timesFR
shows a similar pattern. On the other end of the scale we observe that the probability of ConsistentCC rises from virtually zero
to 43 percent for the highest Agreeableness score observed in our sample. The category 2timesCC displays a similar pattern.
Finally, unlike in Panel A, the remaining observations are more likely to be associated with higher scores of Agreeableness.
18 We  do not introduce a separate category for subjects classiﬁed as Other in all three waves because (i) only three subjects do so and (ii) it is unclear how
we  should interpret a pattern that is consistently inconsistent.
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Fig. 3. Panels A–C: estimated probability of being classiﬁed as either ‘Conditional Cooperator’, ‘Free Rider’, or ‘Other’ dependent on the Big-Five dimension
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1greeableness (demeaned and normalized) in Waves 1, 2 and 3. Panel D: estimated probability of being classiﬁed into one of the ﬁve classes during all
hree  waves of the experiment dependent on Agreeableness. ‘Consistent FR (CC)’ are subjects classiﬁed as Free Rider (Conditional Cooperator) in all three
aves; 2timesFR (CC) are subjects classiﬁed as Free Rider (Conditional Cooperator) in two  out of the three waves; ‘All other’ denotes all remaining patterns.
Taken together, our results suggest that the personality dimension Agreeableness can contribute to our understanding of
he psychological foundations of cooperation preference heterogeneity and stability. Concerning preference heterogeneity,
e ﬁnd that Free Riders and Conditional Cooperators are characterized by different levels of Agreeableness. Regarding
reference stability, we ﬁnd that higher (lower) levels of Agreeableness are associated with more stable preferences for
onditional cooperation (free riding). These ﬁndings are consistent with the limited available evidence on the relationship
etween cooperativeness in economic experiments and the Big-Five dimension Agreeableness. For example, Agreeableness
as been shown to be related to higher contributions in public goods games (Perugini et al., 2010), more cooperative choices in
risoner’s dilemma games (Pothos et al., 2011) and higher donations in dictator games (Ben-Ner et al., 2004a).  Furthermore,
artling et al. (2009) measure competitiveness in a sample of mothers of preschool children by confronting them with the
hoice between competing in a tournament or receiving a piece rate for a real effort task. They ﬁnd that subjects scoring
igh on the personality dimension Agreeableness are less likely to self-select into competition, i.e., into the tournament.
.5. Predicting types
In the beginning of the paper we have argued that an important aspect of economic theory is to make predictions and that
aking predictions is enormously facilitated if peoples’ tastes are stable. So far we have shown that cooperation preferences
re stable at the aggregate level. If we are interested in aggregate outcomes, a prediction that simply extrapolates the observed
hare would be fairly accurate. At the individual level we ﬁnd that about one third of the subjects changes preference type
etween two waves. What does this mean for the predictive power of potential models predicting individual types? In the
ollowing, we  use the data from Wave 1 and Wave 2 to predict a subject’s type in Wave 3. We  then evaluate the predictions
ith the data from Wave 3. We  calculate the accuracy for different methods of predicting individual types in Wave 3, makingncreasingly use of the information we have about our subjects from Waves 1 and 2. The accuracy of a model is simply the
umber of subjects for whom we correctly predict the type in relation to all subjects.
A ﬁrst benchmark is a prediction that completely ignores preference stability and does not take information from Waves
 and 2 into account. Given that there are three types of cooperation preferences we  would make the uneducated guess of
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Table 3
Confusion matrices for four models to predict types in Wave 3 based on observations in Wave 1 and Wave 2.
Predicted type Observed type Performance measures
CC FR OT Accuracy (%) Errors (%)
38 13 17 Type I Type II
Model 1
Covariates: CCt−1, FRt−1
CC 54 33 11 10 13.2 70.0
FR  0 0 0 0 58.8 100.0 0.0
OT  14 5 2 7 58.8 13.7
Model  2
Covariates: Big-Five
CC 60 38 6 16 0.0 73.3
FR  8 0 7 1 66.2 46.2 1.8
OT 0  0 0 0 100.0 0.0
Model  3
Covariates: CCt−1, FRt−1, Big-Five
CC 45 32 4 9 15.8 43.3
FR 9 1 7 1 67.6 46.2 3.6
OT  14 5 2 7 58.8 13.7
Model  4 CC 46 33 3 10 13.2 43.3
Covariates: CCt−1, FRt−1, Agreeableness,
interaction
FR  8 0 8 0 70.6 38.5 0.0
OT  14 5 2 7 58.8 13.7
predicting each of the three types with equal probability. In this case we  would predict the correct type in 33.3 percent of
the cases (in expectation).19
If we only consider information about the aggregate outcome in Waves 1 and 2 to predict individual behavior in Wave 3,
our best estimate for a subject’s type would be the type that occurs most frequently, which is the Conditional Cooperator.
In this case we would be correct for all Conditional Cooperators and wrong for all other types. Thus our prediction would be
correct in 55.9 percent of the cases, which is the fraction of Conditional Cooperators observed in Wave 3.
In a next step we make use of individual information from Waves 1 and 2. A naïve prediction would assign each subject
the type observed before. If we use the type observed in Wave 2 we reach a correct prediction in 69.1 percent of the
cases (see Fig. 2). However, one could as well take the type observed in Wave 1 as prediction for the Wave 3 data, in
which case the prediction would be correct in 58.8 percent of the cases. Ex ante (i.e., not knowing the outcome in Wave
3) we would probably not have been satisﬁed with both approaches, because they do not make use of all information
available.
A natural way of making use of the data from both waves would then be to estimate a model explaining types in Wave 2
by information from Wave 1 and then use this model to predict types in Wave 3. Firstly, we  run a multinomial logit model
explaining types in Wave 2 with two dummies for a subject’s type in Wave 1 as explanatory variables (CCt−1 and FRt−1).
This model allows predicting probabilities for the types in Wave 3, dependent on their type in Wave 2. We  then assign to
each individual the type with the highest predicted probability and list our observations in a so-called confusion matrix.
Model 1 in Table 3 shows the results. The model predicts the type Conditional Cooperator for all subjects who were either
Conditional Cooperators or Free Riders in Wave 2 (54 subjects), the remaining 14 subjects are predicted to remain in the
category Other. In Fig. 2 it is easy to see why this is the case. Between Wave 1 and Wave 2 the largest number of both Free
Riders and Conditional Cooperators moves to the category Conditional Cooperator. The nine numbers in the center of the
table for Model 1 demonstrate the accuracy of the prediction. Among the 54 subjects who  are predicted to be Conditional
Cooperators, 33 turn out to be of that type in Wave 3, 11 are Free Riders and 10 are Others. Bold numbers on the main
diagonal are the observations for which the prediction is correct. The predictive success of the model is simply the number
of correct predictions in relation to all observations in Wave 3 (68). The rightmost column shows the accuracy of Model 1,
which is in this case 58.8 percent.
In Model 2 we use the Big-Five personality dimensions to estimate a multinomial logit model with data from Wave 1
and Wave 2. This model predicts only the types Conditional Cooperator and Free Rider. This reﬂects the results discussed
in the previous section that personality measures are informative for the distinction between Free Riders and Conditional
Cooperators, but not when it comes to the category Others. Model 2 does not take the transition probabilities into account.
The personality measures allow us to predict the correct type in 66.2 percent of the cases in Wave 3.
In Model 3 we combine the personality measures with the lagged type of a subject. This model predicts the occurrence
of all three types and achieves an accuracy of 67.6 percent. Finally, in Model 4 we introduce interaction terms between
the personality measures and the lagged type. This allows accounting for the fact that personality and the probability of
changing type between two points in time are likely to be related. To keep the number of explanatory variables low we  only
interact the most important personality dimension (Agreeableness) with the lagged type. Model 4 improves the prediction
relative to Model 3 and achieves an accuracy of 70.6 percent.
19 If pi is the predicted probability of type i (i = 1, . . .,  n) and qi is the true probability, then the prediction is correct with probability piqi . If all pi are
identical then the sum reduces to 1/n. Thus for three types the hit rate is one third, independent of the true probabilities.
6p
C
a
c
O
C
p
I
t
p
4
p
t
e
m
(
t
a
s
i
t
f
a
m
(
i
c
w
s
S
w
p
R
t
f
t
a
a
h
p
i
f
A
J
A74 S. Volk et al. / Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 81 (2012) 664– 676
Accuracy might not be the only performance measure we are interested in. An alternative approach is to ask which model
erforms best in detecting a speciﬁc type, or, in other words, avoids type I errors (false positives). If we look at the type
onditional Cooperator, clearly Model 2 has the lowest type I error rate. All 38 Conditional Cooperators observed in Wave 3
re predicted to be of that type. For the type Free Rider all models have much higher type I errors. Model 4 performs best,
orrectly identifying 8 out of the 13 Free Riders we  observe in Wave 3. In all models type I errors in predicting the type
ther are high. Finally, we could also look at type II errors, i.e., the case where, e.g., a player is predicted to be a Conditional
ooperator when in fact he is not (false negatives). The rate of type II errors is large in Models 1 and 2, where 70 and 80
ercent of the non-Conditional Cooperators are predicted to be Conditional Cooperators. Even Models 3 and 4 have a type
I error rate of 43 percent. On the other hand, type II error rates are very low for Free Riders in all four models. We  conclude
hat, despite the fact that a substantial fraction of the subjects change their type between waves, information about subjects’
ast behavior in combination with personality measures is highly informative when we aim at predicting individual types.
. Conclusions
Economic theory almost always implicitly assumes that preferences are stable. Yet, empirical evidence on the stability of
references is very limited. Furthermore, economists routinely classify preferences into different types without establishing
he underpinnings of preference heterogeneity. The goal of this study was  to investigate the stability of cooperation pref-
rences over time and to explore the psychological foundations of preference heterogeneity and preference stability. The
ain contribution of our study is threefold.
First, we report high aggregate stability of cooperation preferences over time. This ﬁnding complements Blanco et al.
2011) who report high aggregate stability of social preferences across different games. Taken together, these results suggest
hat theories of social preferences can “provide a system of generalizations that can be used to make correct predictions
bout the consequences of any change in circumstances”, as stipulated by Friedman (1953, p. 4).  Our ﬁnding of high aggregate
tability is also interesting, as it suggests that the heterogeneity of other-regarding preferences reported in previous studies
s temporally stable within the same subject pool. In line with earlier research, we ﬁnd that the most important preference
ypes are Conditional Cooperators and Free Riders, which has important theory and policy consequences (see Gächter, 2007
or a comprehensive discussion).
Second, we provide evidence on the stability of individual preferences over time. Individual-level preference stability is
n important prerequisite for signaling games or reputation mechanisms. Learning another players’ type through signaling
akes only sense if there is such a thing as a stable type (see e.g., the models by Ellingsen and Johannesson (2008) or Levine
1998)). We  ﬁnd that individual-level stability of cooperation preferences over time is lower than aggregate stability. Still,
ndividual stability is high enough so that knowledge about an individual’s past behavior offers substantial informational
ontent when it comes to predicting future behavior. Our results also highlight another interesting aspect. While previous
ork has focused on one dimension of preference heterogeneity, i.e., heterogeneity in terms of preference types, our ﬁndings
uggest there is a second dimension researchers should pay attention to, i.e., heterogeneity in terms of preference stability.
ome individuals seem to have stable preferences, while others do not. However, given the small number of studies on the
ithin-subject stability of cooperation preferences, more research is certainly needed for a proper understanding of this
henomenon.
Third, we provide evidence on the psychological foundations of cooperation preferences. Our results suggest that the Free
iders and Conditional Cooperators identiﬁed in our experiments are subjects with different personalities, as measured by
he Big-Five dimension ‘Agreeableness’. The relation between personality and cooperation preferences is particularly strong
or consistent Conditional Cooperators and consistent Free Riders. Information about subjects’ personality traits improve
he accuracy of our predictions for Wave 3 types beyond what was  possible relying only on behavioral data.
In conclusion, our results indicate that there is heterogeneity of individual behavior in terms of both preference types
nd preference stability, which can be linked to individual differences in personality. Applying an individual differences
pproach to investigate the importance of dispositional factors may  accordingly prove useful for our understanding of the
eterogeneity and stability of cooperation preferences. We believe that future theoretical and empirical research on social
references would beneﬁt substantially from incorporating personality and attitude variables. We therefore call for more
nterdisciplinary research that spans the behavioral economics and personality psychology ﬁelds to cross-fertilize insights
rom both disciplines.
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